Los economistas Michele Boldrin (University of Minnesota) y David K. Levine (UCLA y co-editor de Econometrica) han desarrollado un interesante trabajo sobre las relaciones entre innovación y propiedad intelectual. Sus resultados son bastante críticos con la utilidad de las patentes y copyright como incentivos para la innovación dado que sus análisis teóricos y empíricos demuestran en general la ausencia de relaciones causales entre protección de la propiedad intelectual e innovación. Han escrito un libro de título muy claro en cuanto a sus intenciones Against intelectual monopoly, que aún no ha sido publicado pero ya está disponible a texto completo (en el enlace). El capítulo 9, The pharmaceutical industry ((pdf), analiza el caso de la industria farmacéutica.
Sus resultados, procedentes de un análisis del caso italiano, demuestran que los argumentos de la industria farmecéutica (la necesidad de protección mediante patentes para mantener su inversión en innovación) no son correctos y, en realidad, las patentes generan una reducción del mercado de I+D (por desaparición de las pequeñas compañías farmacéuticas) y un cuasi-monopolio que reduce la innovación. Alex Singleton en el Globalisation Institute Blog (Can pharmaceuticals be developed without patents?) comenta este trabajo de Boldrin y Levine:
Many people can imagine a world full of innovation that does not have patents. But when they think of pharmaceuticals, this seems like an exception. Pharmaceuticals are relatively simple to produce but have high research and development costs. So it's obvious, surely, that there have to be patents in pharmaceuticals.
This exception, however, may not be as necessary as people think ... [Boldrin and Levine] argue that it is not the case empirically that patents increase pharmaceutical innovation. Among the examples they give, they point to Italy. In Italy there were no patents on pharmaceuticals until 1978. Bear in mind that countries like India and even African nations are told they need patent protection in order to develop economically. Yet between 1961 and 1980, 9.28% of the world's new molecular entities (NMEs) came from Italy. NMEs are the most important advances in pharmaceuticals as they represent leaps rather than just gradual progression. The authors suggest that after patents were introduced, Italy actually became less innovative, not more.
The example of Italy will be puzzling to many because it is totally contrary to everything the pharmaceutical industry says. Interestingly, before Italy introduced patents, its pharmaceutical industry contained lots of players: patents quickly reduced the number of companies involved. No wonder Big Pharma likes patents: they restrict competition.
Boldrin y Levine han publicado recientemente un artículo en Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2005, 102:1252-1256), The Economics of Ideas and Intellectual Property (pdf), en el que amplian sus conclusiones sobre la industria farmacéutica a los "mercados de conocimiento". Proponen la eliminación total de patentes y copyright. Como alternativa, en caso de ser precisos los incentivos gubernamentales (que ellos defienden), proponen la utilización de otros mecanismos como subsidios, premios o licencias. De su discusión parece desprenderse que la intervención gubernamental puede ser necesaria en un periodo de transición hasta la desaparición completa de los sistemas de protección de la propiedad intelectual. Esta es la discusión, corta pero contundente, del artículo:
Our own conclusion, based on empirical as well as theoretical considerations, is that on balance it would be best to eliminate patents and copyrights altogether. We have seen that markets for ideas are not so different from other markets. At one time, government grants of monopoly were widely used as a revenue extraction mechanism, and this is still true in the developing world today. Today we are skeptical about government monopolies. The government monopolies in Eastern Europe not only produced fewer and lower-quality goods at greater cost, but managed to do greater harm to the environment in the process. In developed economies, we have gradually replaced inefficient government grants of monopoly with more efficient mechanisms. Although many economists would not recommend eliminating patents and copyrights altogether, all recognize a strong need for reform. We suggest that insofar as it is desirable for the government to provide extra incentives for invention and creation, this is not best done through grants of monopoly, but rather through proven mechanisms such as subsidies, prizes, or monopoly regulated through mandatory licensing. Just as the world has used the World Trade Organization process to gradually harmonize a lower international level of tariffs, increasing greatly the benefits of the free market, so too it should be possible through international collaboration such as Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) to harmonize substantial reductions in patent and copyright protection, greatly increasing the benefits of free trade in ideas.
